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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN OPERATION-A COMPARISON OF
ILLINOIS, CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL LAW
EDWARD MARTIN EINHORN
At common law, the admissibility of evidence is
not affected by the illegality of the means by
which it is obtained.' Underlying this rule is the
principle that an objection to an offer of proof
made upon the trial is limited to questions of
competency, relevancy and materiality of the
evidence. Under the common law, a court will
not concern itself with collateral issues such as
the source of the evidence or the manner in which
it was obtained.2 Thus, so far as the common
law is concerned, evidence obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure is admissible in a
criminal trial, notwithstanding the constitutional
guarantees of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures expressed in the fourth amendment
to the federal constitution and in the constitu-
tions of the various states.3 On its face the com-
' Mc CORMICK, EVIDENCE §137 (1954); 8 Wir-
mORE, EVIDENcE §2183 (3d ed. 1940); 20 Am. JUR.,
EVIDENCE §393 (1939),
2 Ciano v. State, 105 Ohio St. 229, 137 N.E. 11
(1922); State v. Bond, 12 Idaho, 424, 86 Pac. 43 (1906);
Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897);
State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1047 (1896).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
mon law rule of admitting illegally seized evi-
dence seems to conflict with the constitution.
However, the courts have explained away this
seeming conflict by stating that constitutional
rights are subject to protection by civil and
criminal sanctions, and not necessarily by evi-
dentiary rules of exclusion.
4
In 1885, the Supreme Court, by way of dictum
in Boyd v. United. States,5 first suggested that
perhaps the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence is just as violative of fourth amendment
guarantees as are the illegal methods used in ob-
taining such evidence. This suggestion was gener-
ally considered to be an illogical and improper
doctrine,6 although Boyd itself was not directly
challenged in the Supreme Court for twenty
years.
4 Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897),
Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894).
5 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In this case a statute author-
ized the court to require a defendant to produce his
private papers in court. The court held that compulsory
production of a man's private papers to establish a
criminal charge against him was within the scope of
the fourth amendment and thereby unconstitutional.
6Van Hook v. Helena, 170 Ark. 1083, 282 S.W.
673 (1926); State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac.
683 (1924); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W.
89 (1923); Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 Pac.
545 (1923); State v. Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 114 S.E.
257 (1922).
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In 1914, in the celebrated case of Weeks v. United
Slates,7 the Supreme Court reverted to the ap-
proach taken in Boyd and for the first time formally
stated that the exclusion of illegally obtained evi-
dence in federal courts was implicit in the fourth
and fifth amendments. The Court later indicated
that the exclusion of such evidence was pursuant
to a "judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate."8
Stimulated by the stem repressive war measures
against treason and sedition in the years 1917-
1919, and the enactment of the eighteenth amend-
ment and its attendant legislation, the federal
exclusionary rule was very strictly enforced and
its influence soon spread to many of the states. 9
Though Dean Wigmore has said the exclusion-
ary rule was based merely on "misguided senti-
mentality,"" the federal courts have justified
their stand for the most part on the constitutional-
logical-moral ground that courts cannot con-
sistently perform their duty of enforcing the
constitution, and at the same time sanction and
participate in illegal activity by receiving the
fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures."
To do so, it was announced, would deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.12 The rule has also been
7 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949).
9 8 WiGmome, EVIDENCE §2184 (3d ed. 1940). To
date, the exclusionary rule has been adopted in 22
states: Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
The common law rule is followed without qualifi-
cation in 24 states: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Virginia.
In Alabama, the common law rule is not applicable
where the unlawful search is of a private dwelling for
prohibited liquors. ALA. CODE tit. 29, §210 (1940);
Green v. State, 79 So.2d 555 (1955). In Maryland, the
common law rule applies only to felonies. MD. ANN.
CODE: art. 35, §5 (1957); Frank v. State, 189 Md. 591,
56 A.2d 810 (1948).
10 8 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2184 (3d ed. 1940).
1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914);
The duty of giving to it (fourth amendment) force
and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our
Federal system with the enforcement of the laws."
See also Justice Holmes' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928), where he stated that
the "Government should not itself foster and pay for
other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained.. . . I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Govern-
ment should play an ignoble part."
12 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
justified on a much more practical basis, as the
only realistic method of avoiding the persistent
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments by
law enforcement officers.13
The question was then raised as to whether or
not the exclusionary rule would be applied to
criminal cases in the state courts. Weeks had said
that the fourth amendment did not bind state
officers. The Supreme Court then held, in Wolf
v. Colorado,14 that (1) unreasonable searches and
seizures by state lav enforcement officers violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, but (2) states do not have to adopt the
exclusionary rule as there are other means by
which protection against such conduct can be af-
forded. 5
13 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955). Even federal expression of the practical side
of the doctrine was expressed by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499
(2d Cir. 1945), where he said that the exclusionary
rule is the "only practical way of enforcing the consti-
tutional privilege.... " The Supreme Court has not
directly expressed this view, but it is not difficult to
imply the practical approach in many of their de-
cisions. See: Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
14 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
15 A broad exception to this rule is presented when
state search and seizure methods "shock the con-
science." In such a situation, due process will demand
exclusion. A notable example of this exception is Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). (State police officers
broke into the upstairs room of a suspected dope addict,
assaulted him, and then pumped his stomach to recover
morphine tablets which he had swallowed.)
In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), how-
ever, where state police officers and a technician entered
the defendant's house illegally and installed a concealed
microphone in the hall and later moved it to the bed-
room and then to a closet, the Court sustained the
admissibility of evidence so obtained as not violative
of federal law, citing Wolf v. Colorado. The Court seems
to limit the Rochin doctrine to instances of brutality,
coercion or violence to the person as apposed to tres-
passes upon property and invasions of privacy.
Thus, in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957),
the Supreme Court upheld a state conviction based on
the results of an alcoholic blood test performed by
medically approved means on an unconscious motor
vehicle homicide suspect, as there was no real physical
violence. Though the Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on the reasonableness of a search inside a suspect's
body, a Circuit Court, in Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S.
14 (1958), has suggested that if may be permissible in
narcotics cases if it meets two standards: the presence
of probable cause to believe the defendant has internally
concealed narcotics, and, the absence of pain and
danger in the search. The idea seems to be that where
the smuggler so degrades himself as to hide the contra-
band in such a manner, the law should not be powerless
to cope with such tactics.
In King v. United States, 258 F.2nd 754, 755 (5th
Cir. 1958), the Fifth Circuit cited Blackford in up-
19591
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Weeks and Wolf standing together seem con-
sistent, except in a situation where a state agent
makes the illegal search and seizure and such
evidence is presented in a federal trial. Weeks
said that the fourth amendment ban on illegal
searches did not apply to state action. Thus,
after Weeks, where a state officer seized evidence
illegally, in the absence of any federal co-opera-
tion, and handed it over on a "silver platter" to
federal authorities, such evidence was normally
admissible in a federal prosecution.16 This prac-
tice remained until recently, despite the Wolf
case which says that an unreasonable search and
seizure by a state officer violates the federal con-
stitution because the fourth amendment prohibi-
holding a similar search, noting the "sterility which
would follow efforts at law enforcement," if they were
not to allow such searches.
It is interesting to observe the highly practical
approach to this problem taken by these two Circuit
Courts, and perhaps the gravity of the social problem
presented in narcotics cases demands this result. But,
there is perhaps another distinction to be noted, in
that both courts cite language in Boyd v. U.S., 116
U.S. 616, 623 (1886);
"The search for and seizure of . . . goods liable to
duties and concealed to avoid the payment therof,
are totally different things from a search for and seizure
of a man's private books and papers for the purpose
of obtaining information therein contained, or of using
them asl evidence against him. . . . In the one case,
the government is entitled to the possession of the
property; in the other it is not."
There is an apparent split however, in the district
courts on the internal search question. One court has
held that where a defendant, in crossing from Mexico
into the United States under the influence of narcotics
was properly seized and arrested, and the arresting
officers had reason to believe he was concealing nar-
cotics, extraction of a drug container from the de-
fendant's rectum by a doctor under police direction
did not "shock the conscience." Application of Woods,
154 F.Supp. 932 (N.D.Cal.), appeal denied, 249 F.2d
614 (9th Cir. 1957). Accord, United States v. Michel,
158 F.Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1957). Two other district
courts have ruled, however, that the use of a stomach
pump and an emetic to recover swallowed narcotics is
unreasonable. United States v. Willis, 85 F.Supp.
745 (S.D. Cal. 1949); In re Guzzardi, 84 F.Supp. 294
(N.D. Tex. 1949).
16 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Graham
v. United States, 257 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1958); Grimes
v. United States, 234 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1953);
Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d 665 (D. C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948); United States v.
Diuguid, 146 F.2d 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
857 (1945). But, where a state officer conducts a search
on behalf of or in co-operation with federal officers,
the evidence is inadmissible in a federal court. Gambino
v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
tion is to be read into the fourteenth amendment
as a requirement of due process of law.
17
In a recent case, Hanna v. United States,"8 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
attempted to iron out this difficulty and con-
cluded that the only rational view is that the
Weeks and Wolf decisions, considered together,
make all evidence obtained by unconstitutional
search and seizure inadmissible in federal courts;
and it thus prevented a state officer who seized
evidence illegally from presenting such evidence
in a federal prosecution18a
As the Supreme Court did not provide a remedy
that the states had to adopt, Illinois waited nine
years after Weeks to adopt the exclusionary rule,
pointing out when the rule finally was adopted
that the provision of Article II, § 6 of the Illinois
Constitution is practically the same as the fourth
17 338 U.S. 25 (1949).18 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
8a The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a
case which presents almost the same issue as Hanna:
Rios v. United States, 27 U.S. L. WEEK 3293 (U.S
April 20, 1959) (No. 40 Misc.) The exclusionary states
have followed the practice of admitting illegally seized
evidence obtained by federal officers or officers of a
sister state. People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E.
849 (1935). Recently, however, in a 5-4 decision in Rea
v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), the Supreme
Court enjoined a federal officer who had seized evidence
illegally from producing such evidence in a state court
-the converse of the "silver-platter" situation. The
evidence had been previously suppressed in a federal
court.
This decision would again seem to be a definite
departure from the free reign given to the state courts
in the Wolf case; however, one must note that the
decision here did not turn on any constitutional
question, but merely on one concerning the federal
courts' supervisory powers over federal law enforce-
ment agencies. The property seized was contraband
which Congress had made subject to the orders and
decrees of the federal courts having jurisdiction thereof.
How far this federal injunction process may go will
thus seem to depend upon whether the items seized are
or are not in the category of contraband.
It is doubtful that the Court will ever seek to enjoin
a state officer from testifying in a state court, even in
the case of state-federal co-operation, as this would
not only involve an overthrowing of the Wolf case,
but also an invasion and interference with state agencies
in the enforcement of state law. The Court in the Rea
case is very careful to point up this problem. 350 U.S.
at 216.
All states adopting the rule are agreed, however,
that the fourth amendment only protects citizens
from unlawful government interference. Therefore,
when a private individual conducts the unreasonable
search, the evidence is always admissible unless some
government collusion is shown to be involved. Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); People v. Tarantine,
45 Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955); Gindrat v. People,
138 Ill. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
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amendment of the United States Constitution."
The interplay of Article II, § 6 and § 10 (the
equivalent of the fifth amendment of the U. S.
Constitution), has also been noted as a basis for
Illinois' adoption of the rule.O Because of the
constitutional similarities involved, the Illinois
courts have alvays considered the federal deci-
sions important in this area as applicable guide-
posts for their own decisions.21 The two differ in
some aspects, however. These distinctions will be
considered in the following pages.
California waited forty-one years after Weeks
to adopt a policy of exclusion in People v. Cahan?2
When this case reached the California Supreme
Court, most California text writers and law en-
forcement officials were of the opinion that
California was badly in need of "(1) a re-examina-
tion and definition of the rules governing police
searches and seizures, and (2) developing more
effective remedies governing police searches and
seizures".n The Supreme Court of California saw
this problem too, but rather than re-examine the
laws concerning the independent sanctions avail-
able to discourage illegal searches as the Caian
dissent suggested,24 it chose to adopt the ex-
clusionary rule. The court's stated purpose for
this action was the failure of other remedies to
secure a satisfactory measure of compliance with
the constitutional provisions.2 5 It is difficult to
ascertain what, if any, pressures motivated the
California Court. In any case, it adopted a ver-
sion of the federal rule.
To answer the contention that the federal rule
had been arbitrary in its application and had
introduced needless confusion into the law of
criminal procedure, the court stated that they
10 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728
(1923); ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 6.
20 People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944);
A defendant in Illinois must show "not only that the
seizure was unlawful, but also that the violation was
a personal injury, or as it is usually expressed, that
the admission of the evidence would violate his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See also, People v.
Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924); ILL. CoNsT.
art. 2, §10.
21 People v. Exum, 382 Il. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943).
22 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), a 4-3 decision.
The common law rule had been set down in People v.
Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909), and re-
enforced in People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac.
435 (1922).
" Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF.
L. REV. 565 (1955).
2144 Cal.2d at 458, 282 P.2d at 919 (1955).
2 CALIF. CONST. art. 1, §19 which parallels the
fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
would not be bound by the federal decisions ad-
ministering the rule, but would develop their own
"workable rules" governing searches and seizures
and the issuance of warrants.26 In the develop-
ment of such rules, the court recognized the need
to protect both the "rights guaranteed by the
constitutional provisions and the interest of so-
ciety in the suppression of crime."27 Generally,
the California court, in adopting the exclusionary
rule, stated an express purpose of deterring il-
legal methods of law enforcement which trampled
underfoot the state equivalent of the, fourth
amendment. Where there were only minor in-
trusions of privacy or good faith mistakes on the
part of police officers, however, the policy behind
the Cahan rule requires no judicial interference.
With this brief foundation of the rationale of
the rule and its reasons for adoption on the federal
level, in Illinois and in California, the material
below will attempt to survey and contrast the
specific developments which implement the rule
in these three jurisdictions. The main areas to be
examined are: procedure, search and seizure with
a warrant, and search and seizure without a war-
rant.
Procedure
"Judicial distaste for a substantive rule often
finds expression in the creation of procedural re-
straints upon the invocation of such a rule. 2 8
Under this reasoning, even though the exclu-
sionary rule was in fact created by the judiciary,
such procedural requirements as proper standing
and a timely motion to suppress might be inter-
preted as indications of judicial misgivings about
how far the rule should go.
Standing to Suppress. The possibility of such
judicial misgivings is readily suggested by the re-
quirement of standing to suppress. The procedural
limitation in the administration of the rule merely
poses the question: "Does the accused have a
sufficient interest in the property seized to have
standing to object to its use in evidence?" Gener-
ally, in Illinois and the federal system, an accused
cannot complain where he expressly disclaims
ownership in the seized property.29 This is true
2 The California courts have followed the lead of
the federal courts however, in rules applicable to
informers. See note 124 infra.
17 44 Cal.2d at 450 282 P.2d at 915 (1955).
2Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized
Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 471 (1952).
29 Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958);
Lovette v. United States, 230 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.
1959]
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even where the property seized is contraband
which will not be returned to the defendant in
any case.
30
Where the search of a defendant's home is in-
volved, however, a much stricter rule applies.
For example, Illinois courts have held that it
does not matter whether one claims ownership of
the property or not, inasmuch as an unreasonable
search of the home is unreasonable per se.31
1956); United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766 (7th
Cir. 1954); Scoggins v. United States, 202 F.2d 211
(D.C. Cir. 1953); in Re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d
Cir. 1942); People v. Perry, 1 Ill. 2d 482, 116 N.E.2d
360 (1953); People v. Pankey, 349 Ill. App. 303, 110
N.E.2d 683 (1953); People v. De Marios, 401 Ill.
146, 81 N.E.2d 464 (1948).
It is interesting to note that three exclusionary
states and some federal circuit courts hold that a de-
fendant who voluntarily testifies and admits possession
or ownership of the articles seized can no longer object
to their introduction in evidence on the ground that
they were obtained illegally. This proposition seems
to operate on a theory of waiver; i.e., even though the
seizure is improper, if the defendant voluntarily admits
every fact that the state is seeking to show by using
such illegally seized evidence, such seizure is in fact
harmless. U.S. v. Werneche, 138 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1943); Edmondson v. United States, 80 F.2d 517 (5th
Cir. 1935); McFarland v. United States 11 F.2d 140
(9th Cir. 1926); Burks v. State, 194 Tenn. 675, 254
S.W.2d 970 (1953); Huskey v. State, 156 Tex. Crim.
604, 245 S.W.2d 266 (1952); State v. Smith, 357 Mo.
467, 209 S.W.2d 138 (1948). The approach in these
cases would seem to be inconsistent with giving full
force and effect to the fourth amendment right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure. It is, how-
ever, illustrative of the courts' reluctance to let an
obviously guilty party, by his own admission, go free
because of a procedural technicality.
Contra, Kroska v. United States, 51 F.2d 330 (8th
Cir. 1931).
30 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Some
nonexclusionary states hold however, that any evidence
seized is contraband and as such is not the proper
subject of ownership, and thus even when illegally
seized, should be admissibile. State v. Schoppe, 113
Me. 10, 92 Atl. 867 (1915); State v. Pluth, 157 Minn.
145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923); Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio
St. 442, 140 N.E. 370 (1922). This approach seems
much more logical than the rather articificial require-
ment of express disclaimer.
31 People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944).
The Illinois court seems to recognize the element of
practicality in the searching of a car as distinguished
from a dwelling house, and will fail to uphold any
searches of a home without a warrant as such warrant
may be easily obtained. Assertion of ownership thus
becomes an unnecessary secondary fact where a home
is involved.
But, in People v. Clark, 7 Ill.2d 163, 130 N.E.2d
195 (1955), a search of a defendant's home was held
valid without a warrant so long as it was incident to a
valid arrest. This was re-asserted in People v. Boozer,
12 Ill.2d 184, 145 N.E.2d 619 (1957), as long as the
search takes place at the time of arrest. People v.
Kalpak, 10 Ill.2d 44, 140 N.E.2d 726 (1957).
The assertion of ownership requirement, though
supported by most of the courts, would seem to be
artificial, and perhaps unconstitutional at second
glance, because of its conflict with the fifth amend-
ment privilege. For example, where the defendant
avails himself of his fifth amendment privilege by
declining to admit ownership or interest in the
seized property, he is forced to choose between
his fourth and fifth amendment privilege, neces-
sarily forfeiting one to exercise the other.
The sufficiency of the interest held by the ac-
cused in the seized property has also been the
subject of much litigation. To be an "aggrieved
party" under Section 41(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, one must have some direct
relation to the property seized.n Possession or
right of possession is apparently the crucial
factor,13 inasmuch as an owner or employer may
complain even though the property was taken
from the possession of another.3 4 A lessee, sub-
lessee, tenant by sufferance or licensee has stand-
ing, but such person must show that the lease
pertained to the exact situs of the search.3 1 A
guest dwelling on the premises has standing, but
a casual or temporary visitor does not.36 A stock-
holder of a corporation, 7 or a member of a large
32 FED. R. CRim. P. 41 (e); Shurman v. United
States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955); Gorland v. United
States, 197 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Wyche v. United
States, 193 F.2d 703, (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 943 (1952).
3 United States v. Chieppa, 241 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.
1957); People v. Poncher, 358 Ill. 73, 192 N.E. 732
(1934). Mere custody, such as that of an employee,
is usually not enough. But see, United States v. Blok,
188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951), where a desk was
assigned to a government employee; and Chicago v.
Lord, 7 Il.2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955), where an
employee was giving change in an arcade after the
owner had left the premises.
See also, Chicago's Last Department Store v.
Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 161 F.Supp.
1 (Ind. 1958), where an Illinois liquor retailer had no
standing to complain that his customers' rights were
being violated by Indiana police who allegedly used
various pretexts for stopping such customers' vehicles
and searching them for contraband liquor.
m United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
33 Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.
1933), rehearing denied, 63 F.2d 369; Hardwig v. United
States, 23 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1928). No standing how-
ever, will be given to trespassers, Chicoo v. United
States, 284 Fed. 434 (4th Cir. 1922).36 Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); in Re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942).
"I Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947), (sole stock-
holder). In this case, the court pointed out that "docu-
ments which he (the stockholder) could have pro-
tected from seizure, if they had been his own, may be
used against him, no matter how they were obtained
[Vol. 50
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voluntary association,35  may not complain.
Similarly, one of several defendants has no stand-
ing to raise an objection merely because the
seized evidence was obtained through an un-
reasonable search of another defendant's prop-
crty.3
9
California appears to have rejected the more
narrow Illinois and federal approach by granting
standing to one who denied ownership of the thing
being seized, 40 as well as to a mere temporary
guest in residence,4 and to a casual visitor 2 By
relaxing the procedural requirement of standing,
and in reality giving more people a chance to
complain, it would seem that California is actually
stricter in a way than Illinois and federal courts
which rigidly adhere to the procedural aspects of
the rule. This is to be expected however, as the
use of procedural restraints upon the invocation
of the exclusionary rule would not be consistent
with the reasons for the rule's adoption by the
California court in Cahan.
Tinwly Motion to Suppress. In jurisdictions fol-
lowing the exclusionary rule, a motion to suppress
must be timely. However, there seems to be no
uniformity as to just what "timely" means. For
instance, both Illinois and federal courts hold
that one must object before th6 time of trial's
from the corporation. Its wrongs are not his wrongs;
its immunity is not his immunity."
"sHaywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795 (7th
Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1921); Per-
missible, however, in the case of a partner in a small
partnership. In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F.
Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
39 Lusco v. United States, 287 Fed. 69 (2d Cir.
1923); People v. Taylor, 319 Il. 174, 149 N.E. 797
(1925).
40 People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal. 2d 260, 294 P.2d 17
(1956); People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13
(1956); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d
855 (1955).
41 People v. Colonna, 140 Cal. App.2d 705, 295
P.2d 490 (1956).
42 People v. Silva, 143 Cal. App.2d 162, 295 P.2d
942 (1956).
43Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 695 (9th
Cir. 1954); United States v. Wernecke, 138 F.2d 561
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1943); Segurola
v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927); Chicago v. Lord,
7 IlI. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955); People v. Davies,
354 Ill. 168, 188 N.E. 337 (1933); People v. Brocamp,
307 Il. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923). The courts reason
that there should be no interruption in the orderly
course of a trial to try collateral issues such as the
source of evidence sought to be introduced. Failure
to enter a motion at the proper time constitutes a
waiver of the objection or acts as a retroactive consent
to the search. People v. Matthews, 406 Ill. 35, 92
N.E.2d 147 (1950); People v. Brooks, 340 Il1. 74, 172
N.E. 29 (1930).
Only the federal courts, however, have made ex-
ceptions where the accused is unaware of the il-
legality of a particular search, as where the il-
legality appears from the government's own proof,
thus allowing the motion to be made for the first
time at the trial.
44
In California, People v. Berger," decided on the
same day as Cahan, set down immediately that a
pre-trial motion is necessary, again consistent
with the reasons for its adoption of the rule.4
Search With A Warrant
"A search implies some exploratory investiga-
tion or an invasion and quest, a looking for or
seeking out."47 A search implies a prying into
hidden places, which does not include observation
of "that which is open and patent, in either sun-
light or artificial light . . . ,,48 A search must in-
volve a trespass to person or property. 49
4
'
4Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). While Illinois
has not passed on this question directly, there is strong
indication of a willingness to follow the exceptions set
up by the federal cases. People v. Anderson, 337 Ill.
310,328, 16 N.E. 243,250 (1929); "Where it is claimed
that evidence against one accused of crime has been
obtained by an unlawful search of his house and seizure
of his effects, the question of such unlawful search
and seizure must be presented to the court before the
trial, if possible." (Emphasis added). See also, People
v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179 N.E. 850 (1932), where the
court may in its discretion defer the hearing on the
motion until evidence is offered at the trial.
4-131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 282 P.2d 509 (1955). In some
cases, even where proper objection has been made, the
courts have held that the admission of illegally seized
evidence did not constitute error so prejudicial as to
require reversal. There is no per se reversal. People v.
Herman, 329 P.2d 989 (Cal. 1958); People v. Valenti,
49 Cal.2d 199, 316 P.2d 633 (1957); People v. Tobin,
143 Cal. App.2d 1, 299 P.2d 353 (1956); People v.
Jennings, 142 Cal. App.2d 160, 298 P.2d 56 (1956).
This principle is one of the few instances in which the
California courts perhaps are not consistent with the
spirit of Cahan and its avowed deterrence of illegal
police tactics. It is, however, invoked sparingly, and
would seem to apply only to cases where there was
sufficient incriminating evidence against the accused,
without that which was illegally seized.
46The pre-trial motion, like the requirement of
standing to suppress, is procedural restraint, and
has nothing to do with the deterrence of illegal police
tactics.
4 People v. Bouchard, 326 P.2d 646 (Cal. 1958).
See also, People v. West, 144 Cal. App.2d 214,300 P.2d
729 (1956); People v. Patterson, 354 Ill. 313, 188 N.E.
417 (1933).
4s People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943),
where the property was found on the seat of a de-
fendant's auto, revealed by the beam of the arresting
officer's flashlight.
40 The fourth amendment protection is not ex-
tended to include public corridors. Thus, even if a
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Although the fourth amendment does not say
that a warrant must be used for all "searches" as
defined above, it is not hard to imply this from its
words.50 It was for the legislatures and the courts
in their interpretation of the federal amendment
and similar state clauses, to announce that a
search warrant would not be necessary (1) where
incident to a lawful arrest, or (2) where the de-
fendant consented to the search and thereby
waived his constitutional protection.
Illinois, California and federal statutes have
implemented their constitutional provisions by
prescribing detailed regulations governing the is-
suance and serving of search warrants.-" Gener-
ally, the affidavit seeking the warrant must con-
tain three essential elements. They are: (1) a
statement of facts showing probable cause that a
crime has been committed; (2) specification of the
place to be searched; (3) description of the articles
sought with reasonable particularity.- A search
police officer were guilty of a technical trespass in
entering an apartment building and eavesdropping
from the hallway in front of the defendant's apart-
ment, any information thus obtained would be proper
as a basis for arrest or warrant. United States v.
Buckner, 164 F.Supp. 836 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
This question frequently arises in regard to scientific
listening devices. Thus, a detectaphone or amplifier
placed to a wall adjoining the office of a defendant,
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); People
v. Anderson, 145 Cal. App.2d 247, 302 P.2d 358 (1956);
People v. Graff, 144 Cal. App.2d 199, 300 P.2d 837
(1956), and an invitee into the defendant's home
carrying a concealed microphone, People v. Mac-
Kenzie, 144 Cal. App.2d 98,300 P.2d 700 (1956), do not
constitute trespasses, while an illegal police entry to
plant a microphone does. Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Supreme Court has allowed
information obtained by an agent who had a radio
transmitter concealed on his person in On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a 5-4 decision which held
that an unreasonable search had not taken place and
that fair play had not been violated. Similarly, where
at least one party in a telephone conversation consents
to being overheard, any evidence obtained against the
other party is admissible. Rathbun v. United States,
355 U.S. 107 (1957).
Though wiretapping may or may not be considered
as a trepass, it is interesting to note that the Court
does not consider it as a search and seizure problem
at all, but looks only to the Federal Communications
Act §605,48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1952),
which declares wiretapping illegal. Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also, Benanti v. United
States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) where evidence obtained
by the derivative use of wiretapping was held inad-
missible in a federal court even though obtained by
state officers.
50 See note 3, supra.
51 FED. R. CRI. P. 41 (a-g); CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 1523-42; ILL. REV. STATS. c. 38, §§ 691-99 (1957).
2United States v. H-inton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.
1955).
supported by a warrant can thus still be unreason-
able if the warrant is faulty in its issuance or ex-
ecution. Such a defect may in turn be the basis
for suppression of evidence in jurisdictions fol-
lowing the exclusionary rule.
As in arrest with and without a warrant, the
existence of reasonable or probable cause to sup-
port a search warrant may be contested. Although
the concept of probable cause will be fully de-
veloped in a later section, one may now note that
there might be some difference between the prob-
able cause requirement for a search or arrest
warrant and for an arrest without a warrant.
Unfortunately there seems to be a tendency
among the courts to miss this distinction.
A warrant normally will not issue merely on in-
formation and belief.u Thus, a law enforcement
officer cannot secure a warrant unless he has ob-
served the necessary events himself, or can per-
suade a witness to swear to the complaint. Need-
less to say, producing such a witness is often no
small task for the police, especially in view of the
extensive use made of informers. Inasmuch as the
information of an informer is classified as mere
hearsay, unless the informer is disclosed or signs
the complaint himself,- 4 the law enforcement
officer is deprived in many cases of the power to
make a legal search. In this area, the courts have
apparently not recognized the full extent of the
problem facing law enforcement officers and
agencies as a result of organized crime's wide-
spread growth, and continue to impose stringent
requirements upon the issuance of a search war-
rant.
In addition, the scope or extent of a search
pursuant to a valid warrant has usually been
limited strictly to the provisions of the warrant.
This presents further problems to law enforcement
officers, who, in many cases, find it extremely
difficult to describe the particular objects sought
with sufficient clarity, as well as the places at
which they are to. be found.55 California copes
"United States v. Office No. 508 Ricou-Brewster
Bldg., 119 F.Supp. 24 (W.D. La. 1954); People v.
Elias, 316 Ill. 376, 147 N.E. 472 (1925).
14 United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627 (D.C. Wyo.
1930). The courts have recognized this practical
problem in part at least by allowing searches incident
to a valid arrest even though there was reasonable
time to procure a search warrant. U.S. v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950); People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal.
App.2d 63, 300 P.2d 194 (1956); People v. Winston,
46 Cal.2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956). Illinois courts
impliedly accept this approach. People v. Boozer, 12
Ill. 2d 184, 145 N.E.2d 619 (1957).
15 The limited scope of search pursuant to a warrant
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with this problem somewhat by allowing a lawful
seizure where there are goods discovered other
than those particularly described in the warrant. 56
The courts reason legalistically that the initial
entry being authorized by a warrant, when the
goods described are found, an arrest is thereby
authorized. This arrest then justifies further
search as incident to that lawful arrest.1
7
Generally, however, it would seem that not
only is it difficult to procure a warrant, but also
it is equally hard to comply with its terms. For
these reasons, law enforcement officers try to
avoid warrants whenever possible,58 and try to
make their searches incident to a lawful arrest
thereby avoiding altogether the necessity of a
warrant.
Search Without A Warrant
Consent. A search without a warrant is generally
permissible where there is consent to such search.
Who may give consent and the factual determina-
tion of what constitutes legal consent are fre-
quently litigated issues. Consent to a search
amounts to a waiver of the defendant's right to a
motion to suppress. Such a waiver goes to all sub-
sequent proceedings. 59
is to be contrasted to the much broader scope of search
which is permissible when the search is made without
a warrant but incident to a lawful arrest. See: Harris
v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145 (1947). See note 117, infra.
16 People v. Daily, 157 Cal. App.2d 649, 321 P.2d
469 (1958); Ex Parte Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 256, 264 P.2d
513 (1953). But, People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 379,
303 P.2d 721 (1956), distinguished contraband and
property which is merely evidentiary pointing out
that the arrest may not be used as a pretext to conduct
a general search for incriminating evidence.
67 People v. Acosta, 142 Cal. App.2d 59, 298 P.2d
29 (1956).
2 Federal warrant requirements are generally more
stringent than those of the states. U.S. v. Kenney,
164 F.Supp. 891 (D.C. 1958), where the search was de-
clared improper when police officers, after receiving in-
formation as to the whereabouts and business of the
defendant, secured a search warrant for premises known
as 2144 8th St. (this address is used also throughout the
affidavits upon which the warrant was based), and they
then proceeded to 2124 8th St., and only after they had
begun their search did they realize that the address of
the premises on which they were. present was 2124 8th
St. and that the premises described in the warrant was
2144 8th St. On the other hand, California allows
hearsay as the basis for a warrant in certain instances.
People v. Barnett, 156 Cal. App. 2d 900 (1958); People
v. Potter, 144 Cal. App.2d 350 (1956). This is another
instance where California procedure does not seem to
follow the pattern of Cahan, as the hearsay principle
would seem to open the door to possible devious police
methods in obtaining a warrant. But see, note 124 infra.
( People v. Sovetsky, 343 Ill. 583, 175 N.E. 844
(1931).
In Illinois, the privilege to suppress evidence
was originally regarded as a personal one, thus
limiting legally sufficient consent to the defendant
or someone specifically authorized to act for him
in the particular matter.60 Under this view, a
wife could not consent for her husband. However
in People v. Shambley, 61 the court seemed to ignore
existing authority on the issue and allowed a wife
to give consent in her own right as a joint occu-
pant of the premises. This would apparently not
be limited to one's place of residence as the crucial
question is whether the wife had equal rights to
the use and occupation of the premises. Federal
cases are even more liberal in this regard, allow-
ing consent to be given by such third persons as
a common law wife,62 by one who believed she
was a wife, but whose marriage was proved to be
fraudulent,63 by a superintendent of a building,'4
by an employer-owner65 and by one in joint use
and possession. 6 California goes still a step further
and allows consent where made by a mother at
whose home the defendant resided, 67 by one
"who stays at the house from time to time, ' 68
and by one who mistakenly but in good faith
believes he has a right of joint control.6 9
In all jurisdictions the burden of showing that
legal consent has been given is placed upon the
prosecution. The degree of proof required is that
60 People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939);
People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938).
61 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1955). Authorization
must be for the specific purpose of giving consent to
a search and does not arise from a general grant of
authority such as a power of attorney.
6 Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948).
0 United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
64 Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir.
1950). But see, U.S. -. Maryland Baking Co., 81 F.Supp.
560 (N.D.Ga. 1948), where a foreman was not entitled
to give consent for a fellow employee.
5 Milyoncio v. United States, 53 F.2d 937 (7th Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 551 (1932).
66 United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
11 People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751, 290 P.2d 852
(1955).
6 People v. Herman, 329 P.2d 989 (Cal. 1958).
69 People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 291 P.2d 469
(1955). But see, People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 379, 303
P.2d 721 (1956), where police could not justify entry
into an apartment on a good faith belief that the
manager had authority to consent. See also, People
v. Wilson, 145 Cal. App.2d 1, 301 P.2d 974 (1956),
where consent granted after a person has been im-
properly arrested and searched, while he was still in
custody and without having been informed of his legal
right to refuse permission, was not real or proper
consent.
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of dear and positive supporting testimony.
Further, the absence of duress or coercion must
also be affirmatively shown by the prosecution.
7 0
However, the fact that the defendant was under
arrest at the time he consented does not make
such consent involuntary.71 A confession of guilt
preceding consent on the other hand, usually has
no bearing on the question at all.n Generally,
whether or not consent has been given is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined on the weight of the
evidence at the trial and on a conflict of testi-
mony, the decision of the trial court should
govern.Y
Consent must be real, and knowingly made
with no trickery or subterfuge involved.74 It may
be given in writing,7' by informal language or
conduct, 76 by statute,7 7 or by operation of law.7 8
70judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir.
1951); People v. Jennings, 142 Cal. App. 2d 160, 298
P.2d 56 (1956); People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, 173
N.E. 383 (1930).
71 United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.C.
1958); United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th
Cir. 1954); People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App.2d 143, 296
P.2d 93 (1956).
71 Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); People v. Carswell, 328 P.2d 842 (Cal.
1958). But see: United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp.
859 (D.C. 1958), which indicates that a confession of
guilt preceding consent may show true consent.
73People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421, 168 N.E. 344 (1929).
74 People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 379, 303 P.2d 721
(1956); People v. Chatman, 322 I1. App. 699, 54
N.E.2d 631 (1944); People v. Dalpe, 371 Il. 607, 21
N.E.2d 756 (1939). In People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19
N.E.2d 1020 (1939), the police rang the doorbell and
a person inside said "come in," but the court said it
was an unreasonable consent as the officers did not
disclose their identity when seeking admission. But,
in California, in People v. Mendoza, 145 Cal. App. 2d
279, 302 P.2d 340 (1956), the same response was suf-
ficient as a consent to entry despite the fact that the
defendant did not think that the police were outside
his door. Also, in People v. Romero, 327 P.2d 205 (Cal.
1958), where police were with the co-defendant who
was invited in with no objection, the court allowed
the consent as a "passive invitation." This practice
could be questioned as inconsistent with the reasons
behind Cahan. However, the requirement of disclosure
of identity seems both artificial and impractical. On
the federal level, United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1949), allowed consent where an officer
obtained keys from the defendant by means of a ruse
saying, "If you give the keys, I will say I found them,"
when the defendant at first did not consent.
7 People v. Rogers, 8 Ill.2d 279, 133 N.E.2d 16
(1956).
70 People v. White, 324 P.2d 296 (Cal. 1958), ("Cer-
tainly, go ahead . . . I don't live here."); People v.
Garnett, 148 Cal. App. 2d 275, 306 P.2d 571 (1957),
("You are the boss"); People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 39,
301 P.2d 241 (1956), ("No, go ahead"); People v.
Mathews, 406 Ill. 35, 92 N.E.2d 147 (1950), ("I don't
care . . . I have nothing to hide"); People v. Akers,
327 Ill. 137, 158 N.E. 410 (1927), ("I will open it.").
Ordinarily one consent will not justify repeated
searches, and consent to search for one thing does
not permit a general search.7
9
Search Incident To A Lawful Arrest. Search
without a warrant is permissible when incident
to a lawful arrest, 0 and in some instances may
come either before or after the formal arrest.8'
This approach suggests a broad area of exemption
from the warrant requirement, and the exception
seems almost unlimited in scope; i.e., if the arrest is
proper, the search incident to it must also be rea-
sonable. As will be shown later, this is not always
the case but in general, the permissible area of
incidental search has expanded considerably from
its originally narrow grounds of justification, to
meet the needs of practicality. 2
77 Under the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft
Act, ILL. R.v. STATs. c. 95- 2, § 85 (1957), one in the
auto sales business, as a condition of his license, is
deemed to have granted authority to any peace officer
to examine his records, motor vehicles or parts and
accessories at his place of business at any reasonable
time during the day or night. People v. Allen, 407
Ill. 596, 96 N.E.2d 446 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
922 (1951).
78 Parole officers have the power to consent for their
parolees. People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297
P.2d 451 (1956).
79 People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 291 P.2d 469
(1955); People v. Schmoll, 383 I1. 280, 48 N.E.2d 933
(1943).
81 People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258, 171 N.E. 128 (1930).
81 People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d
690 (1957); People v. Sayles, 140 Cal. App. 2d 657,
295 P.2d 579 (1956); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645,
290 P.2d 531 (1955).
The Federal Courts hold that the arrest must precede
the search, but in most of the cases cited for this rule,
there were other reasons for holding the search un-
reasonable, or the statement of the rule was merely
dictum. Ranicle v. United States, 34 F.2d 877 (8th
Cir. 1929); United States v. Waller, 108 F.Supp. 450(N.D. Ill. 1952); United States v. McCunn, 40 F.2d
295 (S.D. N.Y. 1930); United States v. Swan, 15
F.2d 598 (S.D. Cal. 1926). In Illinois, there is a some-
what different variation: Where the defendant was
detained for a traffic violation, it was held to be im-
material that the defendant was never formally charged
or that this charge might later be sustained. People
v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
See also, People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d
820 (1956).
Extending this a little further, if the defendant is
innocent of the crime for which the arrest was made
but is later found guilty of some other crime, the
evidence is admissible in his prosecution for the later
offense. People v. Euctice, 371 Il. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83(1939); People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179 N.E. 850
(1932).
1 The original justification of a search without a
warrant when incident to a lawful arrest recognized
that the arresting officer should be entitled to protect
himself. The immediate search should also prevent
the destruction of incriminating evidence, and deprive
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The search problem generally hinges on the
legality of the arrest which in turn most always
controls the reasonableness of the search and
seizure. Where an arrest with a warrant is in-
volved, an arrest might still be declared invalid
because of an error in its issuance or execution.
In the latter case, the primary search and seizure
problem is a relatively limited one, concerning the
scope of the warrant. Where there is an arrest
without a warrant, however, other problems such
as the probable cause requirement arise. For a
clear understanding of these problems, the statu-
tory provisions for arrest in each of the three juris-
dictions will be considered in terms of their prac-
tical consequences.
Illinois
"An arrest may be made by an officer... with-
out a warrant, for a criminal offense com-
mitted or attempted in his presence, and by an
officer, when a criminal offense has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable ground for
believing that the person to be arrested has
committed it.""
Where a criminal offense, amounting to a mis-
demeanor or felony,84 is committed or attempted
in an officer's presence, there is hardly any ground
for contesting an arrest. Therefore, any search
incident to such an arrest will be proper in most
instances if the methods employed in the search do
not shock the conscience or if the search does not
unreasonably extend beyond the scope of the ar-
rest.
A curious situation arises, however, in its appli-
cation to the crime of carrying concealed weapons,
inasmuch as the courts have held that an arrest
in the officer's presence for this offense cannot be
made unless he has had knowledge or information
of the commission of a crime communicated to
him through his senses.85 This enables one carry-
ing a concealed weapon to stand squarely in the
"presence" of a police officer, dearly committing
a crime and yet be immune from arrest. Thus
the prisoner of potential means of escape. People v.
Brown, 45 Cal.2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955); People
v. Heidman, 11 Ill. 2d 501, 144 N.E.2d 580 (1957).
"I ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 657 (1957).
14 People v. Clark, 9 Ill. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820
(1956); People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359(1950). Illinois takes a liberal view in this regard for
even if the arrest is for a misdemeanor such as a "quasi-
criminal" parking violation, an incidental search isjustified.
85 People v. Kissane, 347 I1. 385, 179 N.E. 850
(1932).
"in the presence of" seems to have been construed
to mean "in the view of," leaving open only the
alternative grounds of reasonable belief that a
crime was being committed. Of course, this would
arise only if the concealed weapon creates an un-
duly large bulge in the person's pocket or shows
slightly; in short, only where the one violating
the law has blundered. This seeming incongruity
has been frequently assailed.86
Frequent litigation arises in this area of reason-
able grounds for believing that the person arrested
has committed a crime. "Reasonable grounds"
is not construed to mean absolute proof, but need
only be such as would influence the conduct of a
prudent and cautious man under the circum-
stances.87 There is no overall standard of reason-
ableness, each case must be decided upon its own
facts and circumstances. 8  Mere curiosity or sus-
picion,8 9 bad reputation, 90 or mere physical pres-
ence with one who is lawfully arrested, 9' will
not in themselves constitute reasonable grounds.
A somewhat different view is expressed in People
v. Doody.8 ' In that case reasonable grounds were
found to exist when an anonymous telephone
message directed the police to look at a certain
car. Arrest was justified on the ground that the
car might otherwise get away.
The officer must know a particular crime was
committed and have reasonable grounds to believe
the defendant committed it before making the
arrest. Subsequent discovery of a weapon or that a
crime was in fact committed by the suspect cannot
relate back to, or operate as justification for, an
arrest. 3 Although an officer might reasonably
86BAKER, MANUAL. ON ThE LAW OF AREsT,
SEARmc AND SEizuRE (Rev. ed. 1946); Washington,
Unlawful Search and Seizure In Illinois, 6 DE PAUL
L. Rxv. 185 (1957).
g7 People v. Boozer, 12 Ill.2d 184, 145 N.E.2d 619
(1957); People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 100 N.E.2d
607 (1951); People v. Euctice, 371 Ill. 159, 20 N.E.2d
83 (1939); People v. De Geovanni, 326 Ill. 230, 157
N.E. 195 (1927).
88 People v. Davies, 354 Ill. 168, 188 N.E. 337 (1933).
89 People v. Gallaway, 7 Ill.2d 527, 131 N.E.2d 474(1956); People v. De Luca, 343 Ill. 269, 175 N.E. 370
(1931); People v. Scalisi, 324 fll. 131, 154 N.E. 715
(1926).
90 People v. Ford, 356 Ill. 572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934);
People v. Humphreys, 353 Ill. 340, 187 N.E. 446 (1933);
People v. Macklin, 353 Ill. 64, 186 N.E. 531 (1933).
91 People v. McGowan, 415 ll. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407
(1953). If an independent act such as running away is
being performed by this person, such act may be suf-
ficient.
92343 Ill. 194, 175 N.E. 436 (1931).
'3 People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603, 27 N.E.2d 44
(1940); People v. Ford, 356 Ill. 572, 191 N.E. 315
1959]
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detain for questioning, he cannot arrest for ques-
tioning.94 There must be an intention to arrest,
which is understood by the one arrested, and a
physical restraint or restriction of the right of
locomotion. 95
The scope of the search presents other litigable
problems; and again the Illinois cases seem con-
tradictory in certain areas. Generally, the right
to search usually extends to that which is in the
immediate possession and control of the de-
fendants.96 This originally included only the
business premises, 97 and the auto. 9 The search
of a dwelling without a warrant was for some time
deemed unreasonable as a matter of law.99 Cur-
rently, however, it appears that the dwelling is no
longer impregnable to the incidental search, pro-
vided the search is made at the time of the ar-
rest."'9 The test may be extended geographically
to a situation involving an arrest on the street
near the defendant's office,' 0' or where he is stand-
(1934); People v. De Luca, 343 11. 269, 175 N.E. 370
(1931).
9 People v. Garwood, 317 Ill. 578, 148 N.E. 259
(1925). See also, Comment, Police Controls Over Citizen
Use of the Public Streets, 49 J. CRn L., CRIn. & P.S.
562 (1959).
9- People v. Clark, 9 Ill. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820
(1956); People v. Mirbelle, 276 Ill. App. 533 (1934);
People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N.E. 715 (1926).
96 People v. Dubin, 367 Ill. 229, 10 N.E.2d 809
(1937); People v. Davies, 354 Ill. 168, 188 N.E. 337
(1933), (This case is usually relied upon by the courts
as condoning a limited right to search as incident to
an arrest, but the facts indicate there was no search
at all).
See also, People v. Poncher, 358 Ill. 73, 192 N.E.
732 (1934), where the court limited the incidental
search to personal property which was involved in the
crime charged.
9 People v. Heidman, 11 Ill. 2d 501, 144 N.E.2d 580
(1957); People v. Davies, 354 Ill. 168, 188 N.E. 337
(1933); People v. Roberta, 352 Ill. 189, 185 N.E. 253
(1933).
Is People v. Barg, 384 Ill. 172, 51 N.E.2d 168 (1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 798 (1944); People v. Marvin,
358 Ill. 426, 193 N.E. 202 (1934). (This case is some-
times used to support an incidental search of the
premises, yet the case involved an auto).
99 People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944).
100 People v. Boozer, 12 Ill. 2d 184, 145 N.E.2d 619
(1957); People v. Kalpak, 10 Ill. 2d 411, 140 N.E.2d
726 (1957), (search was illegal where defendant was
arrested in his home; one hour and a half after taking
defendant to the police station, the police returned to
defendant's home and conducted a search of the
premises; People v. Tillman, 1 Ill. 2d 525, 116 N.E.
2d 344 (1953); People v. McGowan, 415 Ill. 375, 114
N.E.2d 407 (1953).
101 People v. Dubin, 367 Ill. 229, 10 N.E. 2d 809(1937). (In this case the police had a valid arrest
warrant, and exercised it by arresting the defendant
"near" his place of business where the illegal operation
that gave rise to his arrest was going on. The police
ing near his auto,ln but one cannot predict how
far the court may choose to extend the permissible
area of search in a given case.
Federal
"The... agents of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation ... may ... make arrests without
warrant for felonies cognizable under the law
of the United States, where the person making
the arrest has reasonable grounds to believe that
the person arrested is guilty of such felony and
there is a likelihood of his escaping before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest." 103
This statute is somewhat stricter on its face
than Illinois law in that it allows arrest on reason-
able grounds only when a felony is involved. Prac-
tically, this is of little significance as the FBI is
chiefly concerned only with felonious offenses.
The statute on its face also seems to limit search
without a warrant to cases where securing a war-
rant would be impractical under the circum-
stances. In United States v. Rabinowitz,' however,
the Supreme Court held that the legality of a
search without a warrant would not turn on the
question of whether sufficient time existed to
procure a warrant.
Federal law closely approximates Illinois law
in most respects. Reasonable cause for arrest ex-
ists "where facts and circumstances together with
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, are
such as would lead a reasonably prudent person
to conclude that the law had been violated."' 0 5
While mere suspicion is not enough,'0 6 probable
then took the defendant to these premises and searched
them without a warrant. The court, in allowing the
incidental search, merely stated that the premises
were under the defendant's immediate possession and
control, and did not distinguish the fact that the de-
fendant was not arrested on the premises at all.)
102 People v. Barg, 384111.172, 51 N.E.2d 168 (1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 798 (1944). (The defendant, in
trying to escape from his car which was stopped by the
police, fell out of the car onto the road. He was appre-
hended and searched. The keys to the trunk were
found in his pocket, and the car and trunk were
thoroughly searched. The court again, in upholding
the valid incidental search merely reiterated that the
car was in the immediite possession and control of the
defendant.)
Both this case and leople v. Dubin, discussed supra,
indicate that the so-called spacial test of incidental
search is something less than conclusive.
103 62 STAT. 817 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1952).
4 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
115 Bruner v. United States, 150 F.2d 865 (10th Cir.
1945); United States v. Hamm, 163 F.Supp. 4 (E.D.
Mo. 1958).
056 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.
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cause existed where agents observed earlier illegal
activities of the person suspected.'0 7 A major basis
for reasonable cause in federal cases results from
the use of information from informants, an area
as yet undeveloped in Illinois law. Early federal
cases indicated that it would be doubtful whether
an arrest and search should be upheld where there
is no supporting evidence other than reliance on
an undisclosed informer."08 However, the current
state of authority appears to hold that reasonable
cause will be satisfied where the sole basis was in-
formation from the informant; this in spite of the
fact such evidence is hearsay and would not be
competent upon a trial or generally in support of a
warrant."' The informant cannot be anonymous
or unverified but must be reliable and known to
the police."10 Non-disclosure of the informant's
identity will not furnish grounds for reversal or
dismissal, or give an insufficient showing of prob-
able cause unless the disclosure of the source is
relevant, helpful or material to the defense of
the accused, or essential to a fair determination
of the cause"'
1955); Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.
1954); United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d
180 (3rd Cir. 1950).
"07 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
108 Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
109 Grancona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th
Cir. 1958). In this case, informants told police that
marijuana was concealed on foundation blocks sup-
porting a store building, and a police officer made a
preliminary search in the nature of an inspection to
verify the information. The officer located the mari-juana, sampled it, put their initials on the bag and
returned it. Probable cause existed from this total
action.
See also, Draper v. United States, 248 F.2d 295
(10th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)
110 United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d
Cir. 1945); United States v. Mazzio, 162 F. Supp. 935
(D.N.J. 1958).
The reliability question is most always decided by
the judge at the pre-trial hearing on the motion to
suppress. It arises in connection with prosecution ef-
forts to establish reasonable grounds for the arrest on
which the legality of the search hinges.
"I Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957);
Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1955); Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (5th
Cir. 1946), cerl. denied, 330 Un'ted States 839 (1947),
reh. denied, 331 U.S. 863; United States v. Nichols, 78
F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Ark. 194), aff'd, 176 F.2d 431
(8th Cir. 1949).
In Sorrentino v. United States 163 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1947), the court pointed out the distinction between
the case where the person called an informer is that
and nothing more, in which case the defendant would
not be entitled to have his identity disclosed, and the
case where the informer is the person to whom the
defendant is said to have sold and dispersed the contra-
band described in the indictment. In which latter
In Agnello v. United States,112 the court said that
federal officers may not search a dwelling without a
warrant "notwithstanding facts unquestionably
showing probable cause." Similarly, in Jones v.
United States,113 probable cause for belief that cer-
tain articles subject to seizure are in a home can-
not of itself justify a search without a warrant
where the purpose was merely to search. These
cases illustrate the concept that the probable
cause requirement in a search without a warrant
as incident to a lawful arrest, applies to the arrest
and not to the search. Thus, in the Jones case,
if the police officers had possessed probable cause
for an arrest and had entered the house for that
purpose, the search incidental to that arrest
would have been valid.
There is some conflict among the federal cir-
cuits on the question of incidental search of a
dwelling as distinguished from some other laws of
arrest. Although the Fifth Circuit has held that a
search is not automatically rendered invalid by
the fact that a dwelling place is subjected to the
search," 4 that same circuit distinguished between
a dwelling and an outbuilding which was approxi-
mately 150 to 180 feet from the nearest residence
as not part of or located within the curtilage of
the residence." 5 A district court recognized the
search of a dwelling only upon limited exceptions
turning upon the reasonableness of all the cir-
cumstances and not upon the practicability of
procuring a warrant" 6
The Supreme Court allowed the search of a
situation, information as to the informer's identity
would certainly be material to the defense. The prosecu-
tion has the burden of showing immateriality, which is
a question of fact for the trial court. The trial court's
determination is reviewable on appeal, but only pre-judicial error on their part will warrant reversal.
But see, United States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639(W.D. Ky. 1937), where there was an insufficient
showing of probable cause because the trial court had
not required an arresting officer, on cross-examination
by the defendant's counsel, to disclose the name of the
person who informed him, even though the information
was not necessarily material to his defense.
112 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
"1 357 U.S. 493 (1958). See also, Lee v. United States
232 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956), which stated that where
the purpose of the officers was just to search and
when finding contraband then arrest the defendants,
the arrest becomes incident to the search and is invalid.
Of course, this in turn destroys the validity of arrest.4 Drayton v. United States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1953).
11- Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.
1958).
116 United States v. Wallace, 160 F.Supp. 859 (D.C.
1958).
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dwelling in Harris v. United States,"1 holding in a
5-4 decision that an incidental search might ex-
tend to an entire five-room apartment even though
the defendant was arrested in the living room.
This case may have indicated a new trend in in-
terpreting the "immediate possession and control"
test used to limit the scope of an incidental
search."8
An arrest cannot be made merely for the sake
of conducting a roving search." 9 Where it is neces-
sary for an officer to make an arrest at one's home
by breaking and entering into the premises, he
must adequately identify himself and give notice
of his authoritysO
11 133 U.S. 145 (1947). In this case, five federal
agents, arrested the accused with a warrant in the
living room of an apartment which was in his exclusive
possession. Without a search warrant, they searched
the entire apartment (living room, bedroom, kitchen
and bath) intensively for five hours, for two canceled
checks and any other means by which the crimes may
have been committed. Beneath some clothes in a bed-
room bureau drawer, they discovered a sealed envelope
marked "personal papers" of the accused. This was
torn open and found to contain several draft cards
which were property of the United States, and the
possession of which was a federal offense. The court
held that the search was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.
118 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). An in-
cidental search must normally be made at the time of
arrest. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
This case shows the current preference of the federal
courts for a "time" test rather than a spacial test.
See also, Kremen v. Urited States, 353 U.S. 346(1957), where the defendants were arrested and the
entire house was searched and its entire contents re-
moved some 200 miles away to FBI headquarters for
examination. The Court, with two dissents, held that
search and seizure was illegal. However, the tenor of
the decision seemed to turn not on the scope of the
search, but rather on the quantity of the items seized.
119 Drayton v. United States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1953); United States v. Alberti, 120 F.Supp. 171
(S.D. N.Y 1954).
n' Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
Police officers without a warrant, knocked on the door
of the defendant's apartment, and upon his inquiry,
"Who's there?", replied in a low voice, "Police". The
defendant opened the door but quickly tried to close it,
whereupon the officers broke in, arrested the defendant
and seized some marked bills. The court held that
there was no adequate notice of authority, and hence
the search was illegal.
Where the police with a search warrant knocked on
the door for several minutes and evoked no response,
then called out the word "police" and broke in, there
was a legal entry. United States v. Freeman, 144 F.
Supp. 669 (D.C. 1956). But, where there was no re-
sponse and the officers failed to announce who they
were, the entry was illegal. Woods v. United States,
240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 926,
(1957).
The general concept of notice of authority seems
California
"A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience
to a warrant delivered to him, or may without a
warrant arrest a person:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted
in his presence;
2. When a person arrested has committed a
felony, although not in his presence;
3. When a felony has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable cause for believing
the person arrested to have committed it;
4. On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause,
of the commission of a felony by the party
arrested;
5. At night when there is reasonable cause to
believe that he has committed a felony."'
Unlike Illinois, California reasonable cause is
restricted to felonies. Another difference lies in the
fact that when the arrest takes place at night, it
does not have to be shown that a crime has in
fact been committed even though the necessity
of probable cause as a condition to arrest is still
present.
Although there have not been many cases on
the subject, under (2) above, an arrest would
seem possible without probable cause when a
felony has in fact been committed. In People v.
Brown,in the prosecution brought their charge
under (2), claiming that since the defendant was
in fact guilty of a felony, the incidental search was
permissible whether or not reasonable cause for
the arrest existed. The court rejected this con-
tention holding that this would amount to justify-
ing an arrest on the basis of the evidence acquired
incident to that arrest. However, the court said
it was unnecessary to determine whether a re-
quirement of probable cause applied by implica-
tion to (2). This action seems to characterize the
present status of (2). The courts simply avoid it
and look to the other sections. This is another
classic example of judicial unwillingness to effec-
tuate what appears to be obvious legislative in-
tent; however, it has never been pointed out by
the legislature just what they did have in mind by
this provision.
illogical and impractical in law enforcement; however,
the federal courts still cling to it.
It would seem that the hope for more practical
liberalization in the federal search and seizure area, as
evidence by their approach in the Harris Case, is fading
in the area of notice of authority.
12t CAL. PENAL CODE § 836.
w 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1956).
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Reasonable cause "inclines the mind to believe
but leaves some room for doubt."1' 3 Sufficiency
of reasonable cause to arrest in California is per-
haps a little less stringent than in Illinois or the
federal system. Reasonable cause has been found
in the following situations: where the arresting
officer had acted on information from one who had
previously furnished reliable information;12 4 where
police acted on information from an anonymous
informer with other circumstances tending to
support the information;125 where an officer recog-
n People v. Trowbridge, 144 Cal. App. 2d 13, 300
P.2d 222 (1958).
m People v. Gorg, 157 Cal. App. 2d 515, 321 P.2d
143 (1958); People v. Rixner, 157 Cal. App. 2d 387,
321 P.2d 91 (1958), "informant is in good faith believed
to be trustworthy"-This factual discretion question
to be left with the trial court; People v. Dewson, 150
CaL App. 2d 119, 310 P.2d 162 (1958); People v. Hood,
150 Cal. App. 2d 197, 309 P.2d 856 (1958);
Where the reliable information is given to a superior
officer, the informer might still be anonymous as to
the arresting officer and thus be hearsay upon hearsay.
But the courts allow this subordination of authority,
and hold this to be a sufficient showing of probable
cause if there is sworn testimony that the information
upon which the arrest was made, was actually given to
any police officer. People v. Harvey, 156 Cal. App. 2d
516, 319 P.2d 689 (1958).
Though reliability usually requires past successful
dealings with the informer, three juvenile offenders
who all told the same story as to the defendant's
possession of marijuana, were considered reliable as
they had no reason to abricate and their information
as to the defendant's criminal record was confirmed.
People v. Weathers, 328 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1958).
On revealing the informant: People v. Wasco, 153
Cal. App. 2d 485, 314 P.2d 558 (1957), held that non-
disclosure was not reversible error, while People v.
Johnson, 157 Cal. App. 2d 555, 321 P.2d 35 (1958),
said it was not necessary at all. But, in People v.
McShann, 330 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1958), where the informer
was a material witness on the facts directly relating to
the question of guilt, disclosure was required. The
problem seem to come to a head on the same day as
McShann, for in Priestly v. Superior Court, 330 P.2d
33 (Cal. 1958), with three Judges dissenting, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decided to adopt the federal
rule that disclosure is required unless there was suffi-
cient evidence apart from the confidential communica-
tions. Chief Justice Traynor said, "We can't let the
officer become the sole judge of what is probable cause
by letting him establish the lawfulness of the search
merely by testifying that he received information from
a reliable person whose fdentity cannot be revealed.
Such a holding would destroy the exclusionary rule."
Illinois has at least recognized this problem in
People v. Mach, 12 Ill. 2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609 (1957),
where refusal to disclose the identity of an informer who
signed the search warrant that provided authority
for the seizure of vital evidence against the defendant,
was held not to be a denial of the defendant's right to
due process or his right to meet the witness face to face,
in the absence of any showing that he was deprived of
presenting any element of his defense.
125 People v. Diggs, 326 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1958);
nized the defendant previously known to the
officer, and the defendant was at the wheel of his
auto apparently under the influence of narcotics;"5
where officers recognized the smell of opium;" 7
where officers, watching through a window in the
defendant's home, saw a racing form, scratch
pads and that the defendant was answering the
telephone and making notes;12 where the de-
fendant was in the company of a known offender.19
Illustrative of a situation which has been found
not to support a finding of reasonable cause is the
one in which the defendant is parked alone late
at night. In that situation the court held that
absent other circumstances, such as a furtive move-
ment of some sort, 3 0 reasonable cause is not sup-
portable.
Unlike Illinois, the offense must justify the
search. Thus, where the offenses are minor traffic
violations such as an illegal left turn, 3' double
parking,"' blocking a roadway,"' or defective
lights, 34 there is no right of incidental search ab-
sent other circumstances which may reasonably
infer the commission of a more serious crime.
However, the court has allowed a search for mari-
juana where the arrest was for prostitution, justi-
fying their decision by pointing to a so-called cor-
Other circumstances in this case were: 1) a reliable in-
former had given similar information; 2) the anonymous
informer was given marked bills by the police, went to
the apartment in question, and in a short time returned
with three marijuana cigarettes. People v. Sayles, 140
Cal. App. 2d 657, 295 P.2d 579 (1956).
But see, People v. Bates, 330 P.2d 102 (Cal. 1958),
where the court says the use of information from an
anonymous informer may be justified in the case of a
"pressing emergency." (This case followed the Priestly
case, note 121, supra.)
12 People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 143, 296 P.2d
93 (1956).
w People v. Bock Loung Chew, 145 Cal. App. 2d
400, 298 P.2d 118 (1956).
"2 People v. Moore, 140 Cal. App.' 2d 870, 295 P.2d
969 (1956).
129 People v. Hickman, 143 Cal. App. 2d 79, 299 P.2d
389 (1956). However, mere association with a known
offender, or being a past offender, are not sufficient in
themselves. People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d
13 (1956).
130 People v. Washington, 330 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1958);
People v. Rodrigez, 140 Cal. App. 2d 865, 296 P.2d
38 (1956); People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d
57 (1956); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d
531 (1955).
"3 People v. Molarius, 146 Cal. App. 2d 143, 303
P.2d 350 (1956).
3 People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57
(1956).
m People v. Martin, 140 Cal. App. 2d 387, 295 P.2d
33 (1956).
13 People v. Sanson, 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d
422 (1957).
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relation between the two. 35 Finally, the arresting
officer's failure to inform the defendant of the
cause of his arrest has no bearing on reasonable
cause.
36
California takes a broad view as to the scope of
an incidental search. In People v. Cicchello,13 7
officers arrested the defendant and searched his
car which was half a block away; then returned to
his apartment, got the key from him, and searched
the apartment. The search was held to be incident
to arrest, reasoning that since the officers could
have searched the apartment had they arrested
the defendant in it or as he was leaving it, they
could do so under these circumstances. It would
seem that this decision all but does away with the
spacial test of "immediate possession and con-
trol."
The California statute which permits breaking
and entering into a home by an officer if he is re-
fused entrance after notice of his authority,138
has also been given a somewhat broad interpreta-
tion by the California courts unlike the position
taken by the Illinois and federal judiciary. They
have held that compliance with the statute is not
required where compliance would permit the de-
struction of incriminating evidence.13 9
Generally, no derivative use can be made of
evidence illegally seized.' 40 Thus, witnesses whose
names and addresses are found in an illegal search
may not testify, 14' even though they would testify
to things antecedent to the arrival of the police.14
Also oral evidence as to what was found or seen is
135 People v. Cahill, 328 P.2d 995 (Cal. 1958). It
doesn't matter for what the officer is looking. People
v. Harvey, 156 Ca. App. 2d 516, 319 P.2d 689 (1958).
136 People v. Romero, 156 Cal. App. 2d 48, 318 P.2d
835 (1957); People v. Thomas, 156 Cal. App. 2d 117,
318 P.2d 780 (1957).
137 People v. Cicchello, 157 Cal. App. 2d 158, 320
P.2d 528 (1958). See also, People v. Daily, 157 Cal.
App. 2d 649, 321 P.2d 469 (1958), where the defendant
was legally arrested, and the court allowed a search
where the officers found a key to a car parked outside
some fifty to sixty feet away.
-' CAL. PENAL CoDE § 844
189 People v. Miller, 328 P.2d 506 (Cal. 1958); People
v. Moore, 140 Cal. App. 2d 870, 295 P.2d 969 (1956);
People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
140 United States v. Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943 (2d
Cir. 1948), reversed on otlher grounds, 336 U.S. 440(1949); People v. Marvin, 358 Ill. 426, 193 N.E. 202(1934).
(14 People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997
(1943).
(I People v. Albea, 2 Ill.2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277(1954).
incompetent against the accused.' 0 All evidence
illegally seized however, is admissible in federal
courts for the purpose of impeaching the de-
fendant's credibility in a later trial even though
such evidence had been suppressed in an earlier
trial. 44
Conclusion
A summary of the state of the exclusionary rule
in the three jurisdictions under consideration is as
follows:
On the federal level, even after forty years with
the rule, the courts are constantly forced to con-
sider its application, indicating that they have not
been able to arrive at a reasonably dear definition
of the rules governing federal police agencies.
Inconsistency at -the various federal levels is
dearly evident. However, federal law has been
fairly consistent with the underlying principles
behind the rule's adoption, even though its proce-
dural requirements raise some doubt as to whether
the federal courts still fully support the rule.
Abuses by law enforcement agencies have not
been flagrant, nor has there been great hindrance
to federal law enforcement. One must remember
however, that there is a dear distinction to be
drawn between an investigative agency such as
the FBI which can appropriate long hours and
great man power to the preparation of an action,
and a local police force which cannot. The whole
problem needs to be reconsidered and brought into
new focus, particularly in light of newly developed
scientific criminal detection devices, and an ever
increasing narcotics problem. 45
In Illinois, the decisions seem inconsistent and
do not serve as guides to either trained attorneys
or ordinary officers. Stare decisis is attempted by
the courts, but concepts are confused and cases are
misinterpreted. On the one hand Illinois is lenient
'
4 3 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir. 1955).
'
4 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The
court stated: "It is one thing to say that the Govern-
ment cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence un-
lawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which evi-
dence in the Government's possession was obtained to
his own advantage and provide himself with a shield
against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension
of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the
Fourth Amendment."
z Research has revealed that most appellate court
search and seizure cases arising today involve nar-
cotics violations. See Justice Clark's dissent in Rovario
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 66 (1957), pointing out
the severe narcotics problem.
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in not requiring the reason for arrest to be com-
mensurate with the search incident to such arrest
and by allowing an anonymous telephone call to
satisfy the reasonable cause requirement. On the
other hand, Illinois is strict in the defining what
constitutes reasonable cause for arrest, in defining
the scope of an incidental search, and in regard to
the search of a dwelling house. The resultant con-
fusion could be anticipated to be the greatest at
the trial level. Yet, the number of search and
seizure cases reaching the higher Illinois courts
is relatively slight. A thorough re-examination by
the courts, or possibly a codification of the rule
and its attendant principles by the legislature
seems in order.
In California, the more lenient approach can
be traced to the reason for the adoption of the
rule; namely, to deter illegal police methods. The
administration of the rule's procedural aspects
indicate very few instances in which the judiciary
has avoided the spirit of Cahan.146 In the four
years since its adoption in 1955, the California
courts have been consistent in their holdings, and
the general principles laid down by the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Traynor, have been
followed for the most part by the lower appellate
judges. California district courts are seldom re-
versed in search and seizure cases. Though the
Code rules and the Cahan statements are vague,
the "workable rules" set up under them in search
and seizure cases since Cahzan have not on their
face unduly hampered law enforcement. Police
have been able to reasonably rely on consent of
third persons, despite the dangers of "implied"
force caused by the mere presence of an officer
which brings on a resultant natural fear of self-
implication in a crime of some sort. In the area of
reasonable cause, police reliance on third party
information has not been seriously affected. Yet,
the former Attorney General of California, Ed-
mund G. Brown has expressed great disappoint-
ment with the rule and has imputed the rise in
the crime rate in 1957 to the rule."17
46 One instance is that the police can easily tailor
their testimony in the trial court so as to make the
reasonable cause requirement sufficient, by saying
that they intended only to question, as the court has
held in People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57(1956), that if an officer approaches a suspect intending
to arrest him but with no reasonable cause to do so,
any subsequent search is improper even if there are
later independent acts which might justify it.
17 Letter from Edmund G. Brown, former Attorney
General for the State of California, to author, Novem-
ber 28, 1958; on file with the Journal of Criminal Law,
From the date of its adoption, the exclusionary
rule has been debated about pro and con, with
neither faction seeming content with the present
status of the rule. From one side comes the cry
that while the rule was intended to "require a
search warrant issued by a magistrate under nu-
merous safeguards to make a search and seiz-
ure," 4 today's interpretation in modem society
seems to reduce this protection. From the opposite
corner, a cry that the rule was intended as a shield
to the innocent but has become a refuge for the
guilty, and has greatly hampered law enforcement
officers in their efforts against crime.
If we had no exclusionary rule, strong criminal
penalties for violations of the Fourth Amendment
might be the answer. Yet, experience has shown
that public prosecutors hesitate to bring actions
against those upon whose co-operation they must
rely for the successful conduct of the affairs of their
* offices. 149 Michigan has found solace somewhere in
the middle, having exempted from the rule, by
constitutional amendment, arms and narcotics
when seized outside any dwelling house.150 This
approach may be criticized, however, as a form of
class legislation which amounts to a casting aside
of the exclusionary rule altogether in the areas in
which it most frequently arises-firearms and
narcotics.
A review of appellate cases gives but a glimpse
of the overall problem. The true impact of the
rule upon law enforcement is felt at the trial level
as evidenced by a recent survey of the Chicago
"Racket Court." The survey indicated that the
Criminology and Police Science, Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
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149 Under 60 STAT. 843, 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1946), pro-
viding for criminal prosecutions for illegal searches and
seizures, there have been no prosecutions to date; and
no Illinois cases have been discovered in the appellate
courts where a tort action for damages was even
brought.
110 Micir. CoNsT. art. 2, § 10:
Person, houses, papers and possessions of every per-
son shall be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or seize any
person shall issue without describing them or without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation:
Provided, however, that the provisions of this section
shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any
court of criminal jurisdiction ... any narcotic drug, or
drugs, any firearm, rifle... or any other dangerous
weapon or thing, seized by any peace', officer outside the
curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.
The firearms amendment was added in 1936, while
narcotics was exempted in 1952.
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